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Abstract
It has been widely  recognized that both country-specific  relative  weight of global and country-specific  factors in
and global factors matter in explaining capital  flows.  explaining capital flows  to Argentina,  Brazil, Mexico,
Fiess presents  an empirical framework that disentangles  and Venezuela  in the 1990s. When further decomposing
the relative  weight of country-specific  and global  factors  country risk into its determinants,  the author finds  that
in  determining capital  flows. In essence,  his approach  within  a small system it is possible to jointly identify the
first separates the common component  of emerging  determinants of capital flows and sovereign bond
country spreads  from their country-specific  component.  spreads. We  find that capital flows  are driven by country
The pure country  risk and global  risk components are  risk and global factors  ("contagion" and U.S.  long-term
then used as explanatory  variables to account for the  interest rates), while country  risk is determined  by the
observed  pattern of capital  flows using multivariate  primary balance-to-GDP  ratio  (-) and the ratio of public
cointegration  analyses. The author is able to identify  the  debt to GDP (+).
This paper-a product of the Office  of the Chief Economist,  Latin America and the Caribbean  Region-is part of a larger
effort in the region to understand international  capital  flows. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank,
1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Ruth Izquierdo,  room 18-012,  telephone 202-458-4161,  fax
202-522-7528,  email address rizquierdo@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at
http://econ.worldbank.org.  The author may  be contacted  at nfiess@worldbank.org.  January 2003.  (28 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings  of tvork  ti progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues  An objective of the series is to get the findings ozut qutickly,  even if the presentations  are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the niames of the authors and  should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  anzd conclusions expressed in this
paper  are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the vteiv  of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent
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assistance.1. Introduction
It  has  been  widely  recognized  that  both  country-specific  and  global  factors  matter  in
explaining capital  flows  (Fernandez-Arias  and  Montiel  1996,  Taylor and  Somo,  1997).
In this paper we present an empirical  framework that allows us to disentangle the relative
weight of country-specific  and global  factors in determining  capital flows using data for
Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela during the 1990s.
This  paper  is  motivated  in  parts  by the  fact  that after  the  Russian  crisis,  Latin
American  countries  - like  other emerging  economies  - faced  a sharp  decline in  capital
flows.  The experienced  decline in capital  flows after the Russian crisis was general  and
points  to  an  underlying  global  driving  force,  and  different  explanations  have  been
brought  forward  for  such  a  view  (e.g.  sudden  stops  - Calvo  and  Reinhard  1999).
However,  the  recovery  after  1999  was  more  heterogeneous,  indicating  that  country-
specific  factors  had  an  important  role to  play.  While  capital  flows  nearly reached  pre-
crisis  levels  in  Brazil  and  Mexico  in  1999,  capital  flows  in  Argentina  and  Venezuela
continued to fall until 2000 and implode completely in 2001.  We provide an econometric
framework which  allows  us  to implicitly  assess  the  relative  weight of country-specific
and global driving forces for capital flows.
In essence,  our approach separates  the  common component  of emerging  country
spreads  - which,  loosely speaking,  reflects  global  conditions  or  'contagion',  and hence
captures  systemic  risk - from their  country-specific  component,  which  should primarily
reflect each country's  economic  fundamentals  (or, more precisely,  investors'  perceptions
about them) and provide a measure  of each country's pure risk premium.  This procedure
yields  an indicator of global risk which  we view as a summary measure of the  degree of
co-movement  among  emerging-market  spreads.  The pure  country risk and  global  risk
components  are then used as explanatory  variables to account for the observed pattern of
capital  flows  to  the  countries  under  analysis  using  multivariate  cointegration  models
(Johansen  1988).  In  a  final  step,  we  place  restrictions  on the  cointegration  space  and
identify the relative weight of global and country-specific  capital flow determinants using
recursive cointegration tests.
This paper also contributes  to the literature on determinants of country risk as we
further try to identify  its underlying  driving  forces.  We  demonstrate  that within  a small
2system it is possible to jointly identify the determinants of capital flows and country risk
in an economically meaningful way.
The  paper  is  organized as  follows.  Section 2 derives  an indicator of global  risk.
Section 3 estimates  a model for the determinants  of capital flows and assesses the relative
importance of global and country-specific  variables  in determining capital flows.  Section
4 extends  Section 3 by further  decomposing  the country risk premium  into  its domestic
fundamentals within a systems framework.  Section 5 concludes.
1. The Global Factor versus Country Risk, a decomposition  of the Spread
Sovereign bond spreads  are commonly perceived  as reflecting market perceptions  of the
risks  of default,  where  the  probability of default  is  related  to  short-term  liquidity  and
long-term  solvency  risks.  The  determinants  of  default  or  country  risk  are  usually
approximated  by  economic  variables  related  to  solvency and  liquidity,  macroeconomic
fundamentals  and  external  shocks.  Evidence  of substantial  co-movement  in  sovereign
bond spreads  over time indicates  further that yield spreads  do not only capture  country-
specific  information  but  also  relate  to  spillovers  from  developments  in  one  particular
country or to more general global driving factors.
It  is  commonly  assumed  that  the  degree  of  co-movement  in  sovereign  bond
spreads  provides  an  indication  of  the  nature  of shocks  to  emeirging  capital  markets.
Where  an  increase  in co-movement  suggests  that investors  view  a shock  as  a  common
"emerging  market  event",  while  a low  degree  of co-movement  might point to  a set  of
more  idiosyncratic  shocks  (Cunningham  et  al,  2001).  It  seems  therefore  important  to
decompose the spread into idiosyncratic  and systemic risk.
Nellis (1982), Mauro  et al. (2000)  and Dungey et al. (2000) use factor analysis to
decompose  international  interest  rate  spreads  into  national  and  global  factors.  Nellis
(1982)  uses  the  extend  of  interest  rate  variation  explained  by  the  first  principal
component  to gauge  the  degree  of international  financial  integration.  Mauro,  Sussman
and  Yafeh  (2000)  use  principal  component  analysis  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  the
variation  in  the  EMBI  and  EMBI+  is  accounted  for  by  a  common  component  and
compare the degree of co-movement of historic spreads (1870 - 1913)  to that of modern
spreads  (1992-2000).  Dungey,  Martin  and  Pagan  (2000)  use  a  dynamic  latent  factor
3model  to  identify  national  and  global  components  in  interest  rates  spreads  of OECD
countries.
We  follow  this  literature  and use  principal  component  analysis  to  construct  an
indicator  of global  co-movement.  We  argue  that only the  idiosyncratic  portion  of the
spread (residual of a regression of the spread on the first principal component)  is country
risk,  while  the  first  principal  component  itself (systemic  component  of the  spread)  is
driven by global factors  and/or contagion.2
We use end-of the month EMBI spreads for Argentina,  Bulgaria, Brazil, Ecuador,
Mexico,  Nigeria,  Panama,  Peru,  Poland,  Russia  and  Venezuela  from  January  1991  to
February 2002. Data for Argentina,  Brazil and Mexico is available over the whole period.
Nigeria  was included  into the EMBI  in December  1992, Venezuela  in December  1993,
Bulgaria and Poland in November  1994, Ecuador in July 1995, Panama in February  1997,
Peru in May 1997  and Russia in August  1999.
To construct  an indicator of global  co-movement,  we use a rolling window  of 24
month  and use the percentage of the variance  explained by the first principle  component
as an indicator of global  co-movement.  As we use overlapping  windows, each data point
appears  in  24  different  windows.  To  smooth  the  indicator,  we  average  over  all
observations.  The indicator of global co-movement presented  in Figure  1 represents  thus
the average  percentage  of variance  explained  by the first principal  component  at given
point in time.
We  perform  a whole. range of sensitivity  checks.  Excluding  individual  countries
or regions  does  not  change  the  results.  Using  different  window  lengths  or  daily  data
provides  also a similar picture.  Further, using data in levels or first differences  does also
not seem to change the  general picture.  To account for common  US interest rate effects
on  spread  co-movements,  we  also  construct  an  alternative  indicator,  where  we  first
regress  the country  spreads  on US  interest rate  and then perform  factor analysis  on the
residuals  of these regressions. As the residuals of these regressions  are orthogonal to US
interest  rates,  this  procedure  eliminates  any  interest  rate  impact.  The  impact  of this
2  We use the term contagion  quite  loosely.  The focus of our paper at this point is to separate country risk
from global  risk.  We leave  a further  distinction between observed and unobserved components  within the
global driving component  to further research
(see  World  Bank http:i/ddg-as4/prem/Contagion/Definitions  of  Contagion/definitions  of contagion.html
for different definitions of contagion and relevant references)
4adjustment was found to be negligible. This finding is in line with existing studies on the
determinants  of spreads  which  do not find significant and robust effects of US interest
rates on emerging market spreads (see e.g. Kamin and von Kleist,  1999)
Finally,  we  also  extract  the  percentage  of variation  accounted  for by the  first
principal  component  in  a sample  consisting  of EMBI  spread  for  Argentina,  Brazil  and
Mexico. This indicator together with an indicator based on all EMBI spreads is plotted in
Figure 1. Both indicators are highly correlated.  They increase  with the Tequila crisis and
the Asian crisis and remain at a high level until the Russian crises.  It appears  that during
1996 and 1998 the percentage of variation explained by the first principal component was
above  80 percent.  After  the  Russian  crisis,  both indicators  show  a  downward  trend  in
global  co-movement.  The indicator  based  on all  EMBI  components  is generally below
the  indicator of co-movement  for Argentina,  Mexico  and  Brazil3,  however,  it has been
strongly converging to the level of the latter since September/October 2001.4
Figure 1: Indicator of global co-movement
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Note: EMBI all includes Argentina, Bulgaria, Brazil,  Ecuador, Mexico,  Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Poland,
Russia and Venezuela.
3This findings  seems not surprising.  Within  a larger  group  of countries  the number  of potential driving
forces is larger and as such the percentage  of variation explained  by the first principal component  is  likely
to be on average smaller.
4Further analysis is needed  to disentangle  the relative weight of the impact on co-movement  of September
11  and developments  in Argentina at the time.
5An even more simple  summary measure  of co-movement  in country  risk is the mean of
bilateral  correlation  coefficients  of changes  in  spreads  (see  Cunningham  et al.,  2001).5
This measure is calculated over a rolling window of 60 daily observations. An increase in
this measure signals higher co-movement of country risk. The black solid line in Figure 2
depicts  th,is measure  from January  1st,  1997 to December 30h , 2001  and shows that the
degree of co-movement in LAC spreads was very high after the Asian and Russian crisis
and  fell  substantially  since,  though  there  were  some  moderate  rebounds  after  the
devaluation of the Real  and the building up of the Argentine  crisis during 2001.  A further
de-linking  of spreads  is evident  from  September  2001  onwards.  This simple  measure
broadly  reveals  a pattern of co-movement, which is similar to the measure of global  co-
movement derived from principal component analysis  (see Figure 1).
Figure 2
Co-movement  In LAC
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Note: Dotted line is 5% level of significance.
5 Sovereign bond spreads  included in this analysis are for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.  In the case of Chile and Uruguay, we use the Latin
Eurobond Index.
62. Determinants of Capital Flows
2.1 Data
The data used here are from January 1990 to December 2001  for Argentina, Mexico and
Brazil.  Data for  Venezuela  only covers  January  1996  to December  2001.  The data  on
capital  flows was  obtained  as  in Taylor  and Sarno  (1997)  and Mody,  Taylor  and Kim
(2001)  from the data bank of the World Bank, Development  Prospects Group (DECPG).
The  data  on capital  flows  is  from  Euromoney  Bond  and Loanware  and  comprises  of
monthly  records  of  bond,  equity  and  syndicated  loan  flows.  Bond  flows  include
international  bond  issues  by  private,  public  and  secondary  borrowers  in  the  given
country.  Equity  flows  include  international  equity  issues  on  the  international  capital
market  by  all  borrowers  in  the  given  country,  while  loan  flows  account  for  publicly
announced syndicated  loans to public and private borrowers.  Country data on sovereign
bond  spreads  were  obtained  from  JP  Morgan's  EMBI database.  Fiscal  data  are from
national  Central Banks.  In the case of Brazil,  a monthly debt-to-GDP ratio  as well  as a
monthly primary-balance-to  GDP  series  is published by the Banco  do Brasil,  the  latter
series  is  however  only  available  from  January  1995.  Fiscal  data  for  Argentina  and
Mexico are interpolated from quarterly data from  1994 to 2001.
2.3 Findings of Cointegration Analysis
Capital flows to  developing  countries  can  be driven  either by internal,  country-specific
factors  or  external,  global  factors.  Country-specific  or  'pull'  factors  reflect' domestic
investment opportunities  and risk, which  attract funds from abroad.  Global factors  on the
other band 'push'  funds  towards  emerging markets. Push factors  are related to the  level
of economic  activity and  alternative  investment  opportunities  in  developed  economies.
Fernandez-Arias  and Montiel  (1996) introduce an analytical  framework that incorporates
the impact of domestic  and global  factors on capital  flows  and Taylor and Sarno  (1997)
show  that  dynamic  adjustment  can  be  formally  introduced  into  this  framework  by
assuming  a  simple  cost  of adjustment  model.  Within  this  framework,  the  long-run
determinants of capital flows  can be modeled as a function of country specific  and global
factors.
7We follow Taylor and Samo (1997) and Mody, Taylor and Kim (2001)  and model
gross  capital  inflows  as  a  function  of  country-specific  pull  factors  and  global  push
factors.  For the global factors we distinguish between  systemic risk - as identified in the
previous  section  - and  US  long-terrn  interest  rates.  The  country-specific  pull  factor  is
taken  as  the  idiosyncratic  component  in the country  EMBI  spread.  It is  derived  as the
residual  from  a  regression  of  the  country  EMBI  components  on  the  first  principal
component.  This  approach  ensures  that country  risk is orthogonal  to  systemic risk  and
follows  from our reasoning  that only the  idiosyncratic  portion of the  spread  is country
risk.6
Please note, when extracting the idiosyncratic  and systemic part of the spread, we
use the first principal  component  estimated  over the full sample  (1992-2001),  i.e.  we do
not use  a rolling window or averages  of overlapping windows  as in the previous  section.
A  drawback  of this  approach  is  that we  can only  rely  on  spreads  data  for  Argentina,
Brazil  and Mexico,  as data for other countries  become  available  only at  a later point in
time. However, this approach  ensures that we do not use future information on spreads to
explain present levels of capital flows.
We follow Taylor and Samo (1997)  and Mody, Taylor  and Kim (2001)  and model
the global push  factors  as weakly  exogenous.7 When testing  for cointegration,  we use
VAR  models  with  three  lags  and  a  constant  in  the  cointegration  space.  This
parameterization  proved sufficient  to produce  random  errors,  model  specification  tests
are presented in Appendix  1.
Using  country  data  for  Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico  and  Venezuela,  we  find
evidence  for  one  cointegration  vector  for  all  four  countries  (see  Table  1).8  This
cointegration  relationship  suggests  that capital  flows  are  a negative  function of country
risk,  global  co-movement  and  the  long-term  US  interest  rate.  Capital  flows  increase
6  An alternative  approach to extracting the  idiosyncratic  component of the spread could be to regress,  i.e.
the Argentina  component of the EMBI  on the overall  EMBI  and take the residual  from this  regression  as
country risk for Argentina. However,  one draw-back of this approach  is that the country component of the
EMBI is part of the aggregate.  We find that both approaches  yield similar results.
7A test of weak-exogeneity  also confirms such a specification.
8 In the case of Brazil and Mexico, we cannot reject a second cointegration  vector,  however, as a graphical
inspection  of the  cointegration  vectors points to  only one  stationary  cointegration  vector,  we restrict  our
analysis to one.
8when  country risk and systemic  risk declines  and when US  interest rates  come  down.9
This finding is in line with theoretical  arguments  of the pull/push  factor approach, where
capital  flows  to  receiving  countries  increase  if perceived  country  risk  is  low  and  if
interest rate in the creditor country are low.
Table 2 reports  the coefficients  of the  cointegration  vectors  and Table  3 reports
the  adjustment  coefficients  to  the  cointegration  relationships.  We  find  for  Argentina,
Mexico and Brazil that capital flows and not country risk is adjusting to a disequilibrium
position, indicating that country risk is driving capital flows and not the reverse.  Only for
Venezuela,  there  is evidence  that both,  capital  flows  and country  risks  are adjusting  to
disturbances  from the long-run equilibrium.
Table 1: Cointegration Trace Test
Argentina  Mexico  Brazil  Venezuela
Null  Alternative  95% Critical Value
Hypothesis  Hypothesis  (Reinsel-Ahn  corrected)
x ,test
r =0  r>0  44.61  74.68  57.42  48.79  22.09
r  S  1  r> 1  10.50  13.95  15.36  9.14  10.70
Rejection  at  the  5%  level  of significance.  Critical  Values  are  corrected  for  small  sample  bias  using
Reinsel-Ahn correction.
9  In the case of Mexico, the coefficient on country risk is oppositely signed.
9Table 2: Cointegration Coefficients
Argentinal°  Mexico  Brazil  Venezuela
/3  1,8  ,B  /
Capital flows  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000
Country risk  15.581  -3.508  1.089  3.692
(6.557)  (1-183)  (2.409)  (1.173)
Global Co-movement  1.361  1.021  2.133  1.868
(1.195)  (0.465)  (0.895)  (0.519)
US interest rates  1.826  2.858  2.685  1.365
(1.563)  (0.653)  (1.259)  (0.808)
Constant  -17.266  -27.654  -24.216  -7.856
(9.666)  (4.032)  (8.432)  (4.652)
Note: Cointegration vectors  are normalized on the first element. Coefficients are in vector form, as such, a
positive sign on country risk, global co-movement  and US interest rates indicates a negative relationship
with capital flows.
Table 3: Adjustment Coefficients
Argentina  Mefico  Brazil  Venezuela
a,  t-stat.  a  t-stat.  a  t-stat.  a  t-stat.
A Capital  -0.346  -3.612  -1.149  -8.828  -0.616  -6.407  -0.462  -3.488
Flows
A Country  -0.004  -1.302  0.001  0.225  0.000  0.059  -0.055  -5.648
RiskIIIIIIII
Note:  A  indicates  a variable in first differences.
In the  next section  we try to  identify the relative  importance  of country-specific
versus  global factors by placing restrictions  on the identified  cointegration relationships.
We  first provide  full  sample  evidence  and then  assess the  stability of these restrictions
over time. The  latter approach  allows us to  identify if the weight  attributed to country-
specific and global capital flow determinants  has shifted over time.
10 Fore presentational  purposes,  coefficient estimates for Argentina are reported for the  1992:01 - 2001:08
sample.  After 2001:08  the Argentina  spread increase  dramatically and the estimated coefficient  on country
risk  appear  much  higher.  However,  using  a  slightly  smaller  sample  changes  the  magnitude  on  the
coefficient, however, not their sign or significance.
103. Hypothesis  Tests: Test of long-run exclusion
An advantage of the Johansen cointegration  approach  is that over-identifying  restrictions
can be placed  on the  cointegration  space  (Johansen  and  Juselius  1992).  In Table  4 we
present  full-sample  evidence.  Figures  3 to  8 provide  the  results  of recursive  tests  for
different  sub-samples  and  allow  us  to  investigate  if domestic  or  global  factors  can  be
excluded as determinants of capital flows in different sub-periods.
3.1 Full-sample  Evidence:
Table  4 presents  the  results  of hypothesis  tests of long-run  exclusion  for  country  risk
(HI), the common component (112)  and US interest rates (H3). H4 test the hypothesis  of
joint exclusion of the common component  and US  interest rates,  i.e.  the hypothesis  that
only domestic factors matter in explaining capital flows.
Table 4: Tests of Long-run Exclusion 11
Argentina  Mexico  Brazil  Venezuela
(1991:12-  2001:12)  (1991:12-  2001:12)  (1991:12-  2001:12)  (1996:01  -2001:12)
Hi:  x2 (1) =  23.27,  x2(2) =  5.57,  x 2(2) =  12.38,  x2 (1) =  7.81,
p-value = 0.00  p-value = 0.02  p-value = 0.00  p-value = 0.01
H2:  X2(1)=  1.25,  X2(2) =  3.72,  X2(2)=  4.03,  X 2(l)=  13.31,
p-value = 0.26  p-value = 0.05  p-value = 0.13  p-value = 0.00
H3:  x2 (1)=  1.01,  x 2(2) =  7.44,  x2(2) =  10.13,  x22 (1) =  1.00,
p-value = 0.32  p-value = 0.01  p-value = 0.01  p-value = 0.32
H4:  x2 (2)=  1.80,  x2 (4) =  9.61,  x2 (4) =  13.69,  x2 (2) =  14.78,
p-value = 0.43  p-value = 0.01  p-value = 0.01  p-value = 0.00
The hypothesis  (HI) that country risk can be excluded  is strongly rejected  for all
four countries.  The hypothesis  (114)  that global factors do  not matter, is clearly rejected
for Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela, however cannot be rejected for Argentina.
As Table  4  show,  for Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico  and Venezuela  there  is  strong
evidence that idiosyncratic ('pull') factors played a significant role in the observed capital
inflows.  This seems broadly consistent with the de-linking  of country spreads mentioned
l  X  The results for Argentina are not sensitive to the inclusion of 2001,  if 2000:12  is used as the sample end,
the respective HI, H2, H3 and H4 hypothesis test results for the  1992-2000 samnple are: Hi: x2 (1) =
9.81, (p-value = 0.00), H2: Z2 (1)  =  0.02, (p-value = 0.90),  H3:  X2 (1) =  0.63, (p-value = 0.43),  and
H4: x2 (2) =  0.66 (p-value = 0.72).earlier.  On the other hand, we do not find conclusive  evidence that global ('push') factors
played  a major  role  in  capital  flows  to  Argentina.  This  is  in  contrast  with the results
obtained  for  Brazil,  Mexico  and Venezuela,  where we  do  find  significant  evidence  of
global effects.
These results refer to full sample  evidence for both samples,  and it is revealing to
examine  how the model's assessment  of the role  of push and pull  (or global  and local)
factors changes over time. This is done in the following section.
3.2 Sub-Sample Evidence:
In  order  to test  the  stability of the  cointegration  relationship  over time,  we perform  a
recursive  cointegration  analysis.  As  the  number  of  observations  for  Venezuela  is
insufficient for a recursive  analysis, we only report the results for Argentina,  Mexico  and
Brazil.  Operationally,  data  up  to  1994:01  is  used  as  the  base  period  and  then  one
observation  is added until the end of the  sample  is reached.  We test the hypothesis  that
the full sample  estimate  of  /3 with  different  over-identifying  restrictions  imposed  is  in
the space spanned by  /  in each sub-sample.
The  results  of the  recursive  tests  are reported  in  Figures 3 to  8.  The recursive
estimation of the equations reveals  that pull and push factors contributed with a different
weight to the explanation of capital flows  at different points in time. To save space,  only
provide the results of  hypothesis tests HI  and H4, which test for exclusion of 'pull'  and
'push' factors respectively.
The interpretation  of Figures 3 to  8 is  as follows.  The graphs  show  a plot of the
test for constancy of the cointegration  space. When each subsample  is taken individually,
the test is asymptotically distributed  as  X 2 with (p-r)r degrees of freedom, where p is the
dimension of /7 and r is the rank of the cointegration matrix.  The test statistics have been
scaled by the 95%  quantile  in the X2-  distribution  such that unity  corresponds  to a test
with a 5% level of significance.  As such,  a hypothesis  test is rejected if the test statistics
is above one, i.e.  in Figure  3 we test for the exclusion of country risk. As this hypothesis
is rejected  (the null hypothesis  is a cointegration  vector  that excludes  country risk), we
12cannot  exclude  country  risk  from  the  long-run  relationship.  Country  risk  appears
therefore to be an important determinant of capital flows to Argentina.
The graph  clearly suggests  that the contribution  of push factors  and pull factors
changed over time. There is strong evidence that both had a significant impact  on capital
flows to Argentina prior to about 1996.  After the Asian Crisis, only country-specific  risk
reaches statistical  significance,  while push factors become  less important.  Global  factors
become  briefly  significant  in  September  2001  (September  11  effect?),  from  mid  2001
onwards,  there  is  overwhelming  evidence  of a  significant  role  of country-specific  risk
alone.
For  Brazil,  we  find  a  different  pattem.  Global  risk  appears  to  have  lost
significance  after the Asian  crisis (end  1997),  while country risk appears  to matter less
after the devaluation of the Real.  In  Mexico,  country risk matters most prior to Tequila
crisis in 1994/1995,  while global factors appear to influence  capital flows  throughout the
sample.  The  importance  of global  factors  in Mexico  is  however not  explained  by  the
systemic  risk component  of spreads  (global  co-movement)  but by US interest  rates (see
Figure  11  and  12  in the Appendix).  This finding  could be related to  the relative  close
integration of the Mexican economy with the US.
Our findings  are broadly consistent with the picture pained by the two indicators
of co-movement  in  Section  1, which  show  for  1997  to  2001  a  gradual  de-linking  of
country spreads in Latin America as part of a general decline  in co-movement  of country
risk.
13Figure 3: Argentina - Test of Exclusion of Country Risk ('Pull Factor')12
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Figure 4: Argentina - Test of Exclusion of 'Push Factors'
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1 2Figure 9 in Appendix 2 presents  the test of exclusion of country risk based on a different subsample
(1995-2001).  The findings are even more significant.
14Figure 5: Brazil - Test of Exclusion of Country Risk ('Pull Factor')
Test of known beta eq.  to beta(t)
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Figure 6: Brazil  -Test of Exclusion of 'Push Factors'
Test of known beta eq. to beta(t)
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15Figure 7: Mexico - Test of Exclusion of Country Risk ('Pull Factor')
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Figure 8: Mexico - Test of Exclusion of 'Push Factors'
Test of known beta eq. to beta(t)
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164. Determinants of Capital Flows  and Spreads - Simultaneous  Identification
So far, we have  established that country risk is an important determinant of capital  flows
and that increased  country risk reduces capital  inflows.  In this section we try to go one
step further and attempt to uncover the determinants  behind country risk.  In the existing
literature  a  number  of  fundamentals  have  been  suggested  as  possible  explanators  for
country risk including measures of liquidity and solvency, macroeconomic  fundamentals
and external shocks  (see  e.g. Edwards  1986, Haque et al.  1996,  Cline and Barnes  1997,
Eichengreen  and Mody 1998, Kamin and von Kleist 1999, Min 2000).
In  a recent study of country credit rating,  Drudi and Prati (1999)  have identified
the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  and the  primary  balance/GPD  ratio  as  complementary  inputs  in
credit  rating  functions.  Drudi  and  Prati  (1999)  establish  a  testable  hypothesis  which
postulates credit rating as a negative function of the debt-to-GDP  ratio  and as  a positive
function of the primary-balance-to-GDP  ratio. Such an outcome can either be the result of
endogenous uncertainty  on the type of the policy makers  in power  as in Drudi and Prati
(1999)  or the  result  of exogenous  shocks  to  real  interest  rates  (Missale,  Giavazzi  and
Benigno  1997)  or  public  expenditure  (Calvo  and  Guidotti  1990).  In  Drudi  and  Prati
(1999) the timing of fiscal correction is linked  to the credit standing and the debt level of
a country.  Fiscal  stabilization  may be  delayed if no incentive exists  to tighten the  fiscal
stance, i.e. if risk premia and debt levels are below a critical threshold.  As the debt stock
and interest  rate payments  increase  and credit ratings  start to  fall, weak and dependable
governments  will prefer to run primary surpluses  in order to signal  fiscal  sustainability.
Within this framework,  credit ratings  improve,  once primary  surpluses  are consolidated.
In models of exogenous  uncertainty on the other hand, investors  fear a default because a
sufficiently  large shock  on interest  rates  or public expenditure  might  force countries  to
default.  Within  these models, a default  is more  likely, the  higher the  debt stock and the
larger the primary deficit. As in the model of endogenous uncertainty, credit rating again
is a negative function of the debt stock and a positive function of the primary balance.
As credit rating is directly  related to country risk, we consider  the  debt-to-GDP
ratio  and the  primary balance-to-GDP  ratio  as  determinants  of country  risk and  try to
evaluate  if they can be identify in our data set with the predicted  sign.  At this stage we
are  not  interested  in  distinguishing  between  models  of  endogenous  or  exogenous
17uncertainty.  Concentrating  on only two determinants  of country risk further ensures that
we keep our multivariate system manageable  from a point of view of estimation.
The  model  that  we  estimate  in  this  section  consists  for  each  country  of  the
following  seven  variables:  gross  capital  inflows,  county risk,  global  risk, the  US  long-
term interest rate, the ratio of total public debt to GDP and the primary balance-to-GDP
ratio. As before, we include a constant into the cointegration space and select a lag length
of three.  This  again  is  sufficient  to  produce  random  errors.  An  advantage  of a joint
modeling  strategy  of capital  flows  and  country  risk is  that  we  do  not  place  a priori
exogeneity restrictions  on the variables  and  as  such  allow for simultaneity between the
variables.  This should yields a richer understanding of the variables driving capital flows
as well as country risk.
Our VAR models  identify  two cointegration  vectors  for each country (see Table
5).  We interpret the first vector as a relationship  between capital flows, idiosyncratic  and
systemic  risk  and  US  interest  rates,  and  the  second  vector  as  a  relationship  between
country risk and variables of fiscal sustainability.
Table 5: Cointegration Trace Test
Argentina  Mexico  Brazil
Null  Alternative  95%  95%




r=0  r > 0  83.38*  73.93*  123.2*  65.70  53.12
r  <  I  r> 1  46.74*  43.86*  59.85*  43.17  34.91
r  ￿  2  r>2  18.81  16.93  25.74*  24.94  20.17
r  ￿  3  r>3  8.57  6.45  7.13  11.25  - 9.1
'Rejection  at the 5% level of significance. Critical Values are corrected for small sample bias using
Reinsel-Ahn correction.
Once we  place  over-identifying  restrictions  on the  cointegration  space,  we  find
that the first cointegration vector can be identified in accordance  with the findings of the
previous  section, where capital  flows was found to be a  negative function of country risk
and  global  factors  (systemic  risk  and  US  long-term  interest  rates).  The  second
cointegration  vector relates country risk positively to the debt/GDP ratio and negatively
to the primary  balance-to-GDP  ratio and thus  provides  empirical  support  for models  of
18endogenous as well as exogenous uncertainty  as in Drudi and Prati (1999):  Country risk
increases with an increasing debt stock and a decreasing balance-to-GDP  ratio (see Table
6).  Interestingly,  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  and  the  primary balance-to-GDP  ratio  do not
enter  the  capital  flows  equation,  while  capital  flows,  global  co-movement  and  the US
interest rate seem not to affect the pure country risk premium.
Table 6: Joint identification  of determinants of capital flows and country risk
Capitalflows  Country  debtlgdp  Prim./gdp  global  r,,  const.
risk
Argentina: 1994:01 -2001:12
x 2(7) =  4.13,  p-value = 0.25
1  16.311  0  0  5.195  -0.936  -112.340
(4.235)  (0.702)  (1.000)  (21.219)
0  1  -0.153  1.016  0  0  -2.183
(0.055)  (0.176)  (2.021)
Brazil:  1995:01-2001:12
X2(3) =  3.67,  p-value  = 0.30
Capitalflows  Country  debt/gdp  Prim./gdp  global  r, 4 const.
risk
1  6.669  0  0  3.662  6.045  -53.360
(3.041)  (0.727)  (1.812)  (11.919)
0  1  -0.039  0.018  0  0  1.179
(0.006)  (0.024)  (0.215)
Mexico:  1994:01  -2001:12
X2 (3) =  6.61,  p-value = 0.09
Cap  italflows  Country  debt/gdp  Prim./gdp  global  rn.  const.
risk
1  -6.500  0  0  2.392  3.488  -32.705
(1.413)  (0.554)  (0.795)  (4.676)
0  1  -0.218  1.746  0  0  1.349
(0.036)  (0.036)  (0.884)
Note: A I  indicates the variables that has been used to normalize  the cointegration  vector.  A zero indicate
that a zero restriction has been imposed on a coefficient.  Standard  errors  in brackets.  Coefficients  are in
vector form,  as such,  a positive sign on country  risk, global co-movement  and US interest rates  indicates a
negative  relationship  with capital  flows.  A negative  (positive)  sign  for the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  (primary
surplus to GDP ratio)  indicates a positive  (negative) relationship  with country risk.
195. Conclusion
It has  been  widely recognized  that  both country-specific  and  global  factors  matter  in
explaining  capital  flows.  This  paper  presents  an  empirical  framework  that  allows  to
disentangle  the  relative  weight  of country-specific  and  global  factors  in  determining
capital  flows.  In essence,  our approach  separates  the common  component  of emerging
country spreads from their country-specific  component.  The pure country risk and global
risk  components  are  then  used  as  explanatory  variables  to  account  for  the  observed
pattern  of capital  flows  to the  countries under analysis  using  multivariate  cointegration
analyses. We are able to identify the relative weight of global and country-specific factors
in explaining capital flows  to Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico  and Venezuela  during  1990 and
2001  and, on  a general  note, are able to show that the degree of global co-movement as
well as its weight in explaining  capital flows has been declining for all countries since the
Asian and Russian crisis.
We find  strong evidence  that idiosyncratic  ('pull') factors  play a significant  role
in the observed  capital  inflows.  On the  other hand,  we do not find conclusive  evidence
that global ('push') factors play a major role in capital  flows to Argentina.  This contrasts
with results  obtained  for Brazil,  Mexico  and  Venezuela,  where  we do  find significant
evidence of global effects.
We further find that the contribution of push factors and pull factors has not been
stable  during  the  1990s.  Prior  to  the  1996,  there  is  strong  evidence  that both  had  a
significant effect  on capital  flows  to Argentina.  After the Russian Crisis,  only country-
specific  risk reaches  statistical  significance,  while push  factors  become  less  important.
From mid 2001 onwards, there is overwhelming  evidence of a significant role of country-
specific risk alone.
For Brazil, we  find a different picture.  Country risk appears  to loose significance
after the Devaluation of the Real at the end of 1999, while global factors appear to matter
throughout the period.  In Mexico, country  risks matter prior to the  Tequila  crisis, while
US  interest  rates  matter  through  out  the  sample,  pointing  to  the  close  economic
integration of Mexico with the US.
When decomposing country risk into its determinants,  we find that within a small
system  it is possible to jointly identify  the determinants  of capital  flows  and sovereign
20bond  spreads.  We find that  capital  flows  are driven  by country  risk and global  factors
('contagion'  and  US long-term  interest rates), while country risk itself is determined by
domestic growth (-) and the ratio of public debt to GDP (+).
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Ljung-Box  (29)  x2(104) = 86.87
p-value = 0.89
LM(1)  x  2(4) = 5.73
p -value = 0.22
LM(4)  X 2(4) = 3.38
p -value = 0.50
Normality  x2(4)=  61.97
p-value = 0.00
Univariate Statistics
Skewness  Kurtosis  ARCH(3)_.  Normality  Ri
Capital Flows  0.5925  3.019  0.206  9.668  0.511










Ljung-Box (20)  2 (70)= 50.17
r  p-value = 0.96
LM(1)  2 (4) = 13.63
p -value = 0.01
LM(4)  XZ  (4) = 2.83
p -value = 0.59
Normality  X2 (4) =  8.3
p-value = 0.07
Univariate Statistics
Skewness  Kurtosis  ARCEI(3)  Normality  R2
Capital Flows  0.410188  2.654178  1.324  3.792  0.509
CountryRisk  -0.192372  3.715764  8.433  3.920  0 909
24Mexico
Sample:  1992:01-2001:12
Lag Length:  3






Ljung-Box (29)  2  (106) = 122.01
p-value = 0.14
LM(1)  x2 (4) = 1.656
p -value = 0.80
LM(4)  * 2 (4) = 1.906
p -value = 0.75
Normality  . 2(4) =  34.54
p-value = 0.00
Univariate Statistics
Skewness  Kurtosis  ARCH(3)  Normality  R
2
Capital Flows  0.9056  4.0127  2.102  17.312  0.75
Country Risk  -0.6212  5.2879  3.469  16.424  0.10
Brazil:
Sample:  1992:01-2001:12







Ljung-Box (23)  2 (82) = 79.1
p-value = 0.57
LM(I)  X2 (4) = 3.25
p -value = 0.52
LM(4)  X 2 (4) = 0.84
p -value = 0.93
Normality  x2 (4) =  18.65
p-value = 0.00
Univariate Statistics
Skewness  Kurtosis  ARCH(3)  Normality  l2
Capital Flows  0.935959  5.343343  5.102  12.825  0.675
Country Risk  0.208850  3.954908  13.980  5.856  0.102
25Venezuela
Sample:  1996:01-2001:12







Ljung-Box  (15)  2 (50)  = 60.8
p-value = 0.14
LM(l)  X2 (4) = 7.169
p -value = 0.13
LM(4)  X 2 (4) = 10.136
p -value = 0.04
Normality  X2 (4) = 17.805
p-value = 0.00
Univariate Statistics
Skewness  Kurtosis  ARCH(3)  Normality  R 2
Capital Flows  1.20395  5.15462  3.543  13.772  0.408
Country Risk  0.66394  3.58234  0.465  4.783  0.861
26Appendix 2:
Figure 9: Argentina - exclusion of pull factor (1995 -2001)
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27Figure 11: Mexico - Exclusion of US - Interest rate
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